The decline of the US and the new global power struggle: how Active and Proactive States are reshaping international relations by Charles Pennaforte
When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, many analysts predicted that “the West” would isolate the country. However, China, India, Brazil, and several other states did not join the sanctions. Instead, they increased trade with Moscow, negotiated using alternative currencies, and strengthened forums such as BRICS.
Several scholars have described the current moment as “unstable multipolarity”[1], a world with multiple centers of power but no clear rules or stable leadership. Building on this idea, I propose a different way to understand what is happening: the role of Active and Proactive States in responding to what I call the “antisystemic imperative.”
What is the “antsystemic imperative?”
In a recent article in the journal Austral[2], I describe the war in Ukraine as an “anti-systemic imperative”: a moment in which sanctions, wars and crises produced by the core of the system – the United States and the European Union – force peripheral and semi-peripheral states in the Global South to choose between accommodating or contesting the existing order.
I define this antisystemic imperative as the pressure created by sanctions, wars, and crises, which pushes countries towards one of two paths. Proactive States – such as Russia, China, and Iran – directly confront the geopolitical order and attempt to transform it. Active States – such as Brazil and India – seek to limit the power of major powers through diplomacy and initiatives like BRICS, without open confrontation.
The war has extended far beyond the battlefield due to a combination of external shocks and organized responses. It has redefined alliances, accelerated the process of de-dollarization – a process that will likely take decades before it can effectively compete with the dollar in parts of the Global South, and exposed the limits of Western hegemony, particularly in how emerging economies are seeking alternative financial systems and partnerships.
Proactive States: creating a new geopolitical dynamic
In my typology, Proactive States are those that engage in direct confrontation with the hegemonic center, explicitly seeking to alter the balance of power in the international system. They not only criticize the order led by the US and now aggressively reshaped under Donald Trump but also invest economic, military, and diplomatic resources to replace it with another geopolitical order, for example, by promoting alternative alliances or regional partnerships that challenge US influence.
Russia is the most evident example since 2014, and especially after 2022. By challenging NATO’s expansion through military means, Moscow has accepted the cost of broad sanctions, isolation from Western organizations, and a prolonged war. In return, it has deepened ties with China, Iran, and North Korea, attempted to circumvent the dollar, and sought to reposition itself as the center of a bloc openly antagonistic to the West.
China operates differently, with more economic than military emphasis, but it also fits into the Proactive category. The Belt and Road Initiative, alternative Asian banks, and the growing use of the yuan in international transactions form a long-term project to reduce the financial and logistical centrality of the US and Europe.
The common point is clear: Proactive States do not simply resist. They plan alternatives, build new institutions, and act as architects of a new order, even if in a fragmented and initially risky way.
Active States: recognising their systemic limitations
Active States also challenge the Western-centred order but avoid direct confrontation. Instead of positioning themselves as “radical” antagonists of the current geopolitical order, they prefer to exploit gaps and contradictions, gradually expanding their autonomy step by step, often by forming strategic partnerships and leveraging economic opportunities that arise from the weaknesses of established powers.
Brazil, India, and South Africa are excellent examples. They participate in BRICS, advocate reforms in organizations such as the IMF and the UN Security Council, and expand trade with China and Russia while maintaining important relations with the United States and the European Union. This is a delicate balancing strategy: gaining ground without setting off alarms in Washington and Brussels.
In Brazil’s case, this approach became clear after 2022. The country condemned the invasion of Ukraine at the UN but refused to impose sanctions, continued purchasing Russian fertilizers, and supported the expansion of BRICS to include nations such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran. At the same time, it preserved commodity exports to China and economic and military ties with the United States, indicating a complex balancing act in its foreign policy amidst ongoing geopolitical tensions.
Therefore, being in an active state does not mean “sitting on the fence.” It means using diplomacy, trade, and multilateral forums to broaden the room for maneuver without breaking with the West or passively accepting its leadership.
Why does this matter?
This may seem like a technical debate; however, it is not. The way proactive and Proactive states respond to the antisystemic imperative directly affects everyday issues, such as fuel and food prices, exchange rate stability, job opportunities, energy security, and infrastructure investments.
When Russia and Iran decide to sell oil outside the dollar and when BRICS countries discuss the greater use of local currencies, global financing costs and the vulnerability of indebted countries are affected. When Brazil and India draw closer to China for infrastructure and technology projects, they open up alternatives to conditional loans from Western institutions, which can provide more favorable terms and reduce their reliance on traditional financial systems, enhancing their economic sovereignty and allowing for more strategic partnerships.
Meanwhile, escalating tensions between blocs – NATO on one side and the Russia–China–Iran axis on the other – increase the risk of regional conflicts, supply crises, and information wars, with major implications for global stability and security. Understanding who is Active and who is Proactive helps to interpret these developments beyond the surface of daily news.
What is at stake in the next decade?
The war in Ukraine did not create the crisis of the Western order but accelerated a process that was already underway: the erosion of US hegemony, fractures within the European Union, the economic rise of China, and the political strengthening of actors from the Global South. The antisystemic imperative makes neutrality more challenging, pushing states to choose their paths as they navigate the competing influences of major powers and align with Western or non-Western blocs in a shifting global landscape.
If Proactive States succeed in consolidating alternative institutions – financial, technological, and military – we will see clearer multipolarity, with several centers of power in open competition. If Active States expand their coordination, especially within the enlarged BRICS, they can reduce historic asymmetries without falling into new dependencies. Brazil is at the center of this crossroads. By remaining an Active State, it can continue to gain negotiating space between the West, BRICS, and other Global South countries.
The question is whether it will have a long-term plan to turn this active role into proactivity in specific areas, such as energy transition, food security, and critical technologies, or whether it will remain limited to managing crises produced by others.
[1] Fagundes Visentini, P. (2025). A Multipolaridade Instável: : construindo um conceito da transição sistêmica e suas alianças fluídas. REVISTA DE SEGURANÇA, DESENVOLVIMENTO E DEFESA , 2(1), 173–183. Recuperado de https://rsdd.esd.gov.br/index.php/rsdd/article/view/64
[2] Pennaforte, C. (2025). THE UKRAINIAN WAR AS AN ANTI-SYSTEMIC IMPERATIVE AND ITS GEOPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES: THE RISE OF BRICS INFLUENCE. AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, 14(27). https://doi.org/10.22456/2238-6912.143915